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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16189

-vsROBERT DENNIS EAGLE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE~ffiNT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from conviction of theft, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404

(1953), as amended,

in lhe Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,
Judg~,

the Honorable Bryant H. Croft,

presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The app0llant was charged with the offense of theft,

_,

'~la'o'3

l\

~._-(;-.JD.l

;_:' '-l

~ur_-~·

· ,1

11isd<'!'1L'Clnor,
(l9S3),
a~1J

t_ ()

CIS

in violation of Utah Code hnn. S

i1ffi•!nd,,d (R.lO).

':'he appellant was tried

cuil'v'ict\ J of the: o:fcn:;c as

S . }:

I

i:1

~!:

:=: d t

c~argcd

on August

;,af:r, CcJun~y Jail

( R.l06).
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Notice of appeal was timely filed on December 15, 1978, and
bail was set on December 19, 1978 (R.lll,ll4).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction
rendered by the jury in the court below.
£.TATENE:-.<T OF THE FACTS
On March 25, 1978, the appellant and Luke Myles
entered a Z.C.M.I. store located on Nain Street and South
T~mple

Suit

in Salt Lake City.

D~partmcnt

closing

L1m~

shortly before 6:00 p.m., the store's

(?.126).

subsc~ucntly

which he

They were seen in the Men's

Mr.

~yles

was carrying a raincoat

gave to the appellant (R.l29,130).

Clarence Duwayne Price, a security guard for
~.C.M.I.,

a

pLiCL'

saw

~yles

stand at the end of a suit rack at

in tiw store whcre t1'o such racks stood sidc-by-

s Hk ( R. 13 0); seL' also Exhibit 1-S for store's floQr plan).
·:·::·~'

a[;p,·llant h'<'nt in-b,·th'l'L'n the racks on his knees,

t~.H!~

:__hJ .sul t s

L01.t

(H.l3:_).

frcn

th·~

~~1c:Zs

.' .

a:~d

~l

:_ ; - '

stufft_:d lhem inside the

\ :
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registers (R.l32).

When the appellant and Myles saw that

security personnel were pursuing them and that confront&tion was

imrninen~

Myles dropped the suits.

Hr. Price

grabbed the appellant in a bear-hug and the appellant
yelled for Myles to run {R.l36).

At trial it was shown

that the merchandise involved was well over $100 in
valud {Exhibits 4 and 5; R.l35-139).
After each side had presented its case,
defense counsel made a motion out of the presence of the
JUry to have the theft charge dismissed {R.lSO).

The

court denied the motion stating "that the evidence in the
case supported the necessary elements of theft" {R.l58).
A directed verdict for the defendant was also requested
and denied (R.l63).
Jury instructions were discussed in chambers and,
at that time, both parties made several exceptions.
sp~cifically,

appellant excepted to the Court's Instruction

:;o. 10 as a comment on the evidence (R. 57,161, 162).
::1s~ruc~i0J1

The

stated:

. A person's state of mind
susceptible of proof by
dlr~ct and positive evidence, and, if not,
rr,a~· ordlnarily be in:'errcd from acts,
conduct, statemcntsor circumstances.
lS not

al~ays

~~r~llant

al3o 0xc0pted to the court's failure to
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(Appellant's Proposed Insturction No. 6, R. 37, 162).
The court had refused to give this instruction since
such an instruction is only proper where all the evidence
is circumstantial and because there had been evidence at
trial which was direct and positive (R.l63).
The cour.t also refused to give Appellant's
Proposed Insturction No. 7 regarding joint operation of
act and intent (R.38,162).

The court reasoned that since

state of mind was an essential element of the offense,
it was only necessary to define it as an element and
to state what the law is regarding state of mind.
Additional information was not required (R.l64).
Appellant's Supplemental Instruction No.

3 on

withdrawal from criminal activity was not given to the
jury (R.46).

Appellant duly excepted and the court replied

that such an instruction was not supproted by the "facts
and circumstances of the case"

(R.l64).

During closing arguments,

·~ounsel

for the

appellant dealt at length wi•h the fact that the defendant
had

fail~d

to take the stand.

Counsel explained to the

jury that the reason the defendant had not taken the
stand was that it had been counsel's

dec~5ion

as the

accused's attorney (R.l76).

Counsel reasoned that there

was no need for a;)p•.'llant :o

t~sti~~·

added notlll:1CJ •co

·~'<·e

since he could ha\'•'

._·;.:_,;e;",c>' (:\.l7f.).
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In response to this argument, the State referred
to the defendant's failure to take the stand.

The defenae

objected but the court stated:
He [counsel for appellant] has dealt
at some length about that and I will let
you respond in some way. You know what
the limitations are and don't go beyond
that.
(R.l87).

The prosecutor attempted to rebut the argument

that the defendant could have added nothing by testifying.
An objection was made and the court then probhibited any
further comment (R.l87).
A motion for mistrial, based on the prosecutor's
closing comments, was made by appellant (R.l89).

The

court denied the motion stating that the prosecutor's
co~ent

was not even harMless error (R.l90).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO SUBMIT APPELLNJT'S PROPOSED
INSTRUCTIONS.
This court has set the standard for determining

~hen

an instruction must be given to a jury:
It is admitted that the defendant is
entitled to have the jury instructed on
his theory of the case if there is any
substantial evidence to justify giving
such an instruction.

"'"3'c•;

v.

,Jonnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738, 743,744 (1947).

!lso Stat·:c v. Smith,

571 P.2d 578 (Utah 1977).
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In addition, an instruction should not be given when it is
not an accurate statement of the law.
At trial the appellant requested several
instructions and now claims that the failure to submit
his Proposed Insturction Nos. 6 and 7 and Supplemental
Insturction No. 3 was error.
A

APPELLANT'S PROPOSED SUPPLE~ffiNTAL
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 WAS CORRECTLY
DENIED BECAUSE IT IS NOT AN ACCURATE
STATEHENT OF THE LAW AND IS UNSUPPORTED
BY THE FACTS.
Appellant's Proposed Supplemental Instruction
No. 3 is allegedly based upon Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-307

(1953), as amended, which reads:
Voluntary Termination of Efforts Prior
to Offcnse.--It is an affirmative defense
to a prosecution in which an actor's
criminal responsibillty arises from his
own conduct or from being a party to an
offense under section 76-2-201 [76-2-202)
that prior to the commission of the offense,
the actor voluntarily terminated his effort
to promote or facilitate its commission
and either:
(l)
Gave timely warning to the
proper law enforcement authorities or
the intended victim; or
(2)
\~holly deprives his pri
efforts
of effectiveness in the commlssic, ..
The appellant's instruction stated that the defendant would
be "not guilty" i: the jury found :rom the evidence that
defendant v.•holly dc·,,r ivc'd his prior cf:orts in the

t~c

corunissl 2 ~
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This is not an accurate statement of the law
because, in addition to finding that the defendant vbolly
deprived his efforts of effectiveness the jury
find that the defendant voluntarily

~erminated

~•t

alao

his

effort to commit the offense.
In State v. Smith, this Court outlined the
requirements of Section 76-2-307:
For a defendant's actions to be considered
as a voluntary termination under the statute,
he must show (1) that he voluntarily terminated
his efforts prior to the commission of the
offense; and (2) gave timely warning; or (3)
wholly deprived his prior efforts of
effectiveness.
571 P.2d at 580.

In the case at bar, the appellant did not
voluntarily terminate his actions.

Rather, the facts

show that the proximity of the security personnel caused
the termination of the offense (dropping the suits).
Thus, had capture not been quite so immiment, the
appellant would never had "terminated" his efforts.
It cannot be said that the termination was in any way
"voluntary" because appellant only abandoned the goods
~hen

he realized there was no chance of escaping with

Furthermore, appellant's proposed instruction
~2s

not supproted by the facts since under Section
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76-2-307, the actor must voluntarily terminate his
efforts prior to the commission of the offense.

As

will be shown in Point III, infra, the crime of theft
as defined by Section 76-4-404 was completed before
the goods were abandoned.
B

WHEN THE PROSECUTION'S CASE IS
BASED ON BOTH DIRECT AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE
TRIAL COUR~ MAY PROPERLY REFUSE
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS.
Ap;·ellant' s Proposed Instruction No. 6 was
not submitted to the jury.

The instruction read:

To warrant you in convicting the
defendant of the crime charged in the
Information, or of any crime included
therein, the evidence must, to your minds,
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other
than that of the guilt of the defendant;
that is to say, if after a full and fair
consideration and comparison of all th~
testimony in the case you can reasonably
explain the facts in evidence on any
reasonable ground other than the guilt
of the defendant, then you must find him
not guilty.
(R.37).

Appellant contends that the failure to submit

the above instruction was reversible error; however,
the trial court did not err because the element of

intent v.·as not based solely on circumstantial evidence.
In Stale v.

Garci:~,

ll l;tilh 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57
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. • • It is universally recognized
that there is no jury question without
substantial evidence indicating defendant'•
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
requires evidence from which the jury
could reasonably find defendant guilty
of all material issues of fact beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In applying this rule,
usually with reference to the jury
instructions, we have held that where
the only proof of material fact or one which ia
a necessary element of defendant's guilt
consists of circumstantial evidence, such
circumstances must reasonably preclude
every reasonable hypothesis of defendant's
innocence.
An instruction to this effect
in an appropriate situation would be proper
but this requires care to use language which
the jury would understand and which would
not merely lend to their confusion.
We must keep in mind that this rule is
applicable only where the proof of a material
issue is based solely on circumstantial
evidence . • .
355 P. 2d at 59 (emphasis added).

See also State v. Bender,

581 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1978).
It should be noted that the prosecutor in this
case felt that the appellant's proposed instruction may
have been appropriate since he believed that the evidence
v:as

wholly circumstantial.

The distinction to be made

1s that the instant case is not based solely on circumstantial
c~id~nce.
:h~

testimony of Mr. Clarence Price constituted direct

LVld~nc~

·.:J.:o

The physical evidence introduced at trial and

b.>s~d

which convinced the trial judge that the case
on direct evidence:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-9Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.

Where we have evidence here that
is direct and positive, eye-witness
testimony of two guys taking a suit,
wrapping it in an overcoat, throwing
it over their shoulder, starting to
walk out the store, that is not
circumstantial evidence.
I don't
think under the facts and circumstances
of this case the reasonable hypothesis
instruction is proper.
(R.l63,164).
Where the evidence is not completely circumstantial, the trial judge may properly leave the
determination to the jury on the basis of reasonable
doubt.

State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976);

State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970);
State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P. 2d 486 (1961).
Even a combination of direct and circumstantial
evidence would not warrant such an instruction.

State v.

Fort, 572 P.2d 1387, 1390, 1391 (Utah 1977).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence was
all circumstantial, an instruction on reasonable
alternative hypothesis need not be given.

In Holland v.

United States, 348 U.S. 121, reh. denied 348 U.S. 932
(1954), the petitioners assailed the refusal of the
trial judge to instruct that v:here the Government's
evidence is circumstantial it must ba such as to exclude
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• • • the better rule is that
where the jury is properly instructed
on the standards for reasonable doubt,
such an additional instruction on
circumstantial evidence is
confusing and incorrect [citation•
omitted].
Circumstantial evidence in thia
respect is intrinsically no different
from te~timonial evidence. Admittedly,
circumstantial evidence may in some
cases point to a wholly incorrect
result.
Yet this is equally true of
testimonial evidence. In both
instances, a jury is asked to weigh
the chances that the evidence correctly
points to guilt against the possibility
of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference.
In both, the jury must use its
experience with people and event• in
weighing the probabilities. If the
jury is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt, we can require no more.
~

at 139-140.
The law is primarily concerned that an

accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(1953), as amended.
tt~

j~ry

~~ide~ce

is circumstantial it must exclude every
hypothesis other than guilt.

If a jury,

lveighing all evidence whether circumstantial or

j_r~:=,

• '

There is no need to risk confusing

with instructions to the effect that if the

r~2sonable

c:;-o:-~

Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-501

is convinced of a defendant's guilt beyond

:,:;c;'.:lble doubt to1C law is satisfied.
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Respondent submits that the evidence introduced
at trial was direct rather than circumstantial and, at
best, was a combintation of direct and circumstantial
evidence; therefore, the trial court was correct in not
submitting the instruction on reasonable alternative
hypothesis to the jury.
POINT I I
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WAS
CO~STITUTIONAL SINCE IT DID NOT
DEMAND THAT INTENT BE PRESUMED.
The court offered the following instruction
to the jury as part of Instruction No. 10:

• A person's state of mind is
not always susc~ptible of proof y direct
and positive evide~ce, and, if not, may
ordinar ·l.Y be infe:·red from acts, conduct,
statements or circumstances.
(R. 57)

(emphasis added).
Appellant now contends that allowing

~o

~he

jury

infer intent is a denial of due process of law under

the Fourteenth i©endr:1Cnt to the United St;:1tes Constitutior.
bc'causc· it has the effect of shifting the burden of
;.o-·t·su.>slon to thc defcnciant.

;__:. s.

ur

Appellant solely relics
,

99 S.Ct.

... '

~-

0:1

2450 (1979),

'

. \!

;- .._ t 1 ~- -
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outlined two types of instructions in this area that
would deny due process:

(1) an instruction constituting

a burden-shifting presumption like that in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421

u.s.

684 (1975), where the burden shifted

to the defendant to prove that he lacked the requisite
mental state; or (2·) a conclusive presumption (irrebuttable)
which would eliminate intent as an element of the offense
and would conflict dangerously with the presjmption of
innoence.

Therefore, the instruction stating that •the

law presumes intent" was declared unconstitutional because
it could have been interpreted as either a burdenshifting
presumption or a conclusive presumption.

99 S.Ct. 2459.

short, it required the jury to infer intent, effectively
relieving the State of its burden of proof.
Furthermore, it is proper for a jury to infer
intent from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances.
In State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 486, 359 P.2d 486, this
Court held:
It is to be remembered that intent,
being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible
of direct proof. But it can be inferred
from conduct and attendant circumstances
in the light of human experience . . . .
2=9 P.2d at 487.

This Court also stated in State v. Romero,
-:,.J P.2u 216,

218

(Utah 1976), that intent to steal
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In

property can be inferred by defendant's conduct and the
attendant circumstances testified to by the witnesses.
See also State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 196,
"[W)e are aware of no better nor persuasive

198 (1967):

way to do it {prove what a man intended) than by showing
both what he did and what he said.
In the case at bar, the jury was not directed
to automatically find intent.

The instruction described

a permissive inference of intent rather than the type of
conclusive presumption prohibited by Sandstrom.

The jury

was told that they "may" infer intent, therefore, the
State was not relieved of any burden.

The prosecution

was still required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
~very

fact necessary to constitute the offense.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE COURf
BELO\~.

The fundamental rule governing a claim of
insuffici~nt

evidence on appeal is that the evidence

and all inferences fairly to be
b~

dra~n

therefrom must

viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's

verdict.

State \'.

1-:ilso:-~,

565 P. 2d 66

(Utah 1977).

\'il•\.:ing thL' cvidc•nce prcsc•ntcd at trial in the light
most favorable to the VLrdict,

includinq any reasonable
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(Utah 1977); State v. Canfield, supra, clearly the record
contains substantial evidence from which the jury could
infer appellant took the suits with the requisite
criminal intent.
Appellant argues that because he was not
successful in leaving z.c.M.I. with the two suits, he
cannot be said to have committed the offense of theft.
However, successful conversion of the goods is not an
element of the offense.
In order to find guilt in the theft charge
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1953), as amended,
the jury must find that the accused obtained or exercised
unlawful control over the property of another with a
purpose to deprive the owner of that property.

The

evidence in the record and the inferences fairly drawn
therefrom, vie1ved in the light most favorable to and
supportive of the verdict are as follows:
1.
int~nding

to deprive them of their merchandise.
2.

t~o

':..::,

The appellant entered the Z.C.M.I. store

The appellant dropped to his knees between

suit racks and stuffed two men's suits into a raincoat.

~to:-~

3.

The appellant did not pay for the suits.

4.

The appellant then attempted to leave

\-;ith the goods.
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5.

The appellant was beyond the last cash

register, just short of the door, when he was apprehended
by security personnel.
This evidence supports a finding by the jury
that the appellant exercised unauthorized control over the
property with the intent to deprive thereof.
This Court in State v. Middelstat, 579 P.2d 908
at 909 (1978), stated that before it can be said that the
evidence is insufficient to uphold a conviction, it must
be shown that the quality of the testimony given is "so
improbable that it is completely unbelievable."

In this

case the jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve the
State's witnesses, one of which was an eye-witness to the
commission of the offense.

In the case of State v. Wilson,

this Court stated:
The judging of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence is
exclusively the prerogative of the jury.
Consequently, we are obliged to assume
that the jury believed those aspects of the
evidence, and drew those inferences that
reasonably could be drawn therefrom, in
the light favorable to the verdict.
Id . .:lt 68.
rurt11Lrnor~,

~dditio~al

information in the
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for insufficient evidence.

Counsel for appellant then

argued that at best the State had only shown atteapted
theft.

The court denied the motiong stating:
[T]he crime of theft involves not
so much an act, as an intent followed
by an act.
It is like burglary. You
enter a building with the intent to commit
a theft. The fact you don't succeed in
committipg that theft doesn't make it any
less a burglary. The crime is committed
when the building is entered unlawfully for
that purpose.
The purpose to deprive means
to have the conscious objective to do
something, to deprive the owner of the
property. And so when you do something
with that conscious objective, the
fact you don't get away with it and
don't succeed in accomplishing that
objective, doesn't mean that you are not
guilty of the offense itself. (R.l57,
158)
I think when somebody wraps up two
suits in a topcoat and slings them over
their shoulers, thinking they are buried,
and starts to walk out of the 'store, he
is exercising unauthorized control over
:he property.
In sum, the evidence in this case justifies

the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
facts.
stcr·•,
s:.L::cs
:~:~~

o:·

That is, that the appellant went into the
took ti·:O suits off of a rack, wrapped the
ln

a raincoat and started to leave without

Lhrough the usual process when buying a suit

:_:~l'~i::g
· - ., - •

:o a clerk, discussing the merchandise,
L~c

suit on and without paying for the
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POINT IV .
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT ON THE
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY
WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A.
THE REMARK WAS A PROPER
RESPONSE TO DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT.
Ordinarily, a prosecutor is not allowed to comment
on the defendant's failure to testify.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).

Griffith v. California,

However, in a number of cases it has

been held that a defendant cannot complain

that a comment

on his failure to testify was error when the remark was
invited or provoked by the defendant's attorney.

For

example, the Eighth Circuit in Babb v. U.S., 351 F.2d 863
(1965), held that reference to the defendant's failure
to take the stand made by the defendant's attorney with an
explanation of such failure was an invitation to the prosecute:
to respond and comment on the subject.
This Court has also held that a responsive comment
on a defendant's failure to testify is not error.
\'. Boone,

581 P.2J 571

referred to the court's

In State

(utah, 1978), the defense attorney
i~struction

on the defendant's right

not to ta!~e the stand and suggested reasons for the defendant's
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decision not to take the stand.

The prosecutor reaponde4 to

this argument by stating that there could have been other
reasons why the defendant had not testified, such aa the
fear of rigorous cross-examination.

The Court atated:

The reply of the prosecutor was
not improper and did not emphasize
the failure of the defendant to
testify. That matter have been brought
up by the defendant's counsel and the
prosecutor was simply emphasizing one
of the reasons suggested by defense
counsel as to why the defendant did not
take the stand.
Id.

at 574.
Similarly, in this case, the defendant referred

to the court's Instruction No. 6 regarding a defendant'•
failure to take the stand (R. 175-176).
offered an explanation

Counsel then

for choosing not to put

the defendant on the stand:

that it had been counsel's

decision as the defendant's attorney and that the defendant
could add nothing to the evidence by testifying (R. 176).
In reply, the prosecutor did not emphasize the
de:endant's failure to testify, rather, the comments were
ncrely responsive to remarks made by defense counsel.
Stut~.
~o

The

contrary to the defense attorney's position, attempted

s'lo\·.' that the defendant could have added something--he
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could have revealed the reason why he did not go to the
first cash register in the men's suit department (R. 187).
In short, the prosecutor's response was proper and,
therefore, does not require that the conviction be reversed.
B.

EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE REMARK
WAS ERROR, IT WAS ONLY HARMLESS ERROR.
Assuming that the prosecutor's comment on the
defendant's failure to testify was error, it was harmelss
error because (1)

it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

and (2) the trial judge immediately stopped any further
comment on the subject.
In Chaoman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the
United States Supreme Court defined the standard for harmless
error.

The Court held that when a reviewing court is asked

to decide if a remark pertaining to a defendant's failure to
testify violates the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
~gainst

self-incrimination,

an error is harmless if it is

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
th~t

The Court also explained

this standard was the equivalent of the standard

an::o:Jnccd in

fa~v

~.

Ccnnocticut,

U.S.

85

(1963),

that an

on·or is h.1rJ:\e>lss unle>ss there is a "reasonable possibility

convictio;-1."

Id . .1t

?t),

S~
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In this case, the prosecutor's comment iD
closing argument was harmless since the evidence va•
sufficient to justify conviction regardless of any reference
to the defendant's failure to testify.

Furthermore, the

alleged error was cured by the trial judqe's conduct in
preventing further ~ornrnent and was sufficient to cure any
potential prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the jury inthe laver
court was properly instructed on the law.
entitled to be given an instruction on

A defendant i•

his theory of the

case only if there is substantial evidence to support such
iastruction.
~:as

The appellant's

supple~nntal

r.ot a correct statement of the law.

Instruction No. 3

In addition, an

instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis was not
required in this case because of proof of intent to deprive
~as

not solely based on circumstantial evidence.

t~e

Court's Instruction No. 10 was an accurate definition

of

t~e

Finally,

law because the jury rnay properly infer intent from

,~~3:~ti-::,:L:r

acts, co:1duct, statements or circumstances.
T~e

,~t::1:~~~g
~c;: "::c;~··c

corn~ents

made during closing argument

to the defendant's failure to testify were
i:!nd therefore, not reversible error.

Even
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assuming the remark was error, it was only harmless error
because it was not prejudicial to the defendant.

The

evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, therefo",
the prosecutor's comment did not contribute to the conviction
and in short, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, respondent urges this Court to
affirm the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury in the
court below.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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